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Summary 
Th ere are many papers in the economic literature that examine the link between 
real wages and labor productivity while each of them have diff erent approaches and aspects 
of research. It is widely believed that in many countries wage growth has fallen massive-
ly behind productivity growth and has caused a productivity-wage gap popularly called 
“the great decoupling”. Th e paper deals with this important issue at the level of Croatia, 
Germany and Poland by analyzing trajectories and causality between compensations of 
employees and productivity per person employed. It is important and unique because it 
presents a new empirical approach that observes the productivity-wage gap between these 
countries on the individual state level. Th e research reveals interesting results about how 
the great decoupling in the observed countries is a myth according to the rate trends. How-
ever, there is causality between labor productivity and compensation of employees (and 
vice-versa) for Germany and Poland, but not for Croatia.
Key words: the great decoupling, inverse decoupling, productivity-wage gap, 
Granger causality.
1. INTRODUCTION
Th e divergence of productivity growth and wages has been recently discussed 
in economic literature due to growing income inequality. Th is divergence between real 
labor income and output per hour worked (labor productivity) has been termed “de-
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coupling” (Mishel and Gee 2012). Decoupling does not have a precise defi nition, but it 
loosely refers to the diff erence between wages and productivity, or rather the idea that 
wage growth is substantially lagging behind productivity growth (Pessoa and Van Re-
enen, 2013, p. 6). Baker (2007) states that it is widely accepted that most of the workers 
have received relatively few benefi ts from the economic growth over the last decades. 
Unfair upward redistribution has emerged in which most of the national income goes to 
profi t and high wage earners (Baker, 2007). 
Th is paper deals with the productivity-wage gap while empirically testing the 
causality between productivity per person employed and compensations of employees 
on the example of Croatia, Germany and Poland. Th ere could be some diff erences in the 
wage-productivity gap according to the level of economic development (Dabla-Norris 
et al., 2015; Sharpe et al., 2008; Van Biesebroeck, 2011). Th erefore, the analysis includes 
Germany which represents one of the world’s strongest economies, Poland as one of the 
most successful and progressive EU economies and Croatia as a less developed econ-
omy that still struggles to achieve signifi cant economic development. Even more, the 
economic situation has an impact on the eff ectiveness of the labor market and along 
with some economic, social and demographic features of employees can be the source 
of wage - productivity gap (Goraus and Tyrowicz, 2014; Zajkowska, 2013).
Th e existing literature on this topic deals with the productivity-wage gap but 
most of it does not observe this issue on an individual country level and is concentrat-
ed mostly on the connections between real wages and productivity per employee. Our 
approach is original in researching the impact of labor productivity on compensations 
for the observed countries while the contribution made by our research is to provide 
further support in analyzing the degree, direction and even determinants of productiv-
ity-wage gap for the European countries. Th e two-stage Granger causality test has been 
applied to determine the causality between productivity and compensation of employ-
ees by using quarterly data during 2000Q1-2015Q4.
Th e chapters are structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents the theoretical back-
ground of empirical analysis; Chapter 3 deals with the empirical background of “the 
great decoupling”; methodology and data for the empirical analysis are explained in 
Chapter 4; the results and discussion can be found in Chapter 5, and the implications of 
the empirical analysis are revisited in the concluding remarks.
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS
Each country needs to focus on labor productivity due to its importance for eco-
nomic development. Labor productivity is a very important variable for planners and 
policy makers because it measures a country’s ability to generate goods and services 
from a given amount of production factors. Human capital has been one of the most 
important factors that has signifi cant eff ects on productivity. Labor force is responsible 
for planning, starting and ending each action in production while being important in 
establishing a quality relationship between wages and productivity. Th e rise in labor 
35
POSLOVNA IZVRSNOST ZAGREB, GOD. XII (2018) BR. 1 Bosna J.: Estimation of the Great Example of Croatia, as Compared with Germany and Poland
productivity should have a positive impact on wages – when there is an increase of la-
bor’s marginal productivity, according to theory, an increase in wage rates can be ex-
pected. On the other hand, wages motivate workers to make further improvements in 
their productivity (Patra and Nayak, 2012).
However, if wages and productivity rise together, it means they are sustainable 
and able to create incentives for further economic growth. Conventional macroeco-
nomic theory supposes that a rise in productivity drives wage growth while the compet-
itive equilibrium is a situation when the wage rate equals the marginal productivity rate. 
Th ere is a causality running from productivity growth to wage growth assuming that 
productivity growth is unrelated to labor market conditions. 
Meager and Speckesser (2011) state that the relationship between wages and pro-
ductivity is very clear according to the standard microeconomic theory. Although this 
theory has many simplifying assumptions, theoretical links between productivity and 
wages have been extensively used as a criterion for the wage setting mechanism. If the 
growth of wages exceeds productivity growth, companies need to reduce productivity 
and employment in order to survive. Otherwise, if companies face wage growth that is 
much faster than productivity growth, they would need to improve productivity growth 
that reduces employment opportunities. Th erefore, in order to maintain high employ-
ment levels, companies should have wage growth that is below productivity growth. It 
is important to emphasize that authors state that it would be more realistic to include 
total labor compensations growth rather than growth of wages when analyzing the great 
decoupling.
In the absence of any market distortions, assumptions of the existence of perfect 
competition in the labor market and profi t maximizing behavior of fi rms under con-
stant returns to scale, imply that real wages should be equal to the marginal product of 
labor (MPL). When fi rms take product and factor prices as given, it is obvious from the 
profi t maximization behavior that the real wages should equal the marginal product 
of labor. However, this theoretical result is not empirically supported for various econ-
omies (Elgin and Kuzubas, 2013:2). If there is no link between wage and productivity 
growth, workers do not receive the appropriate remuneration for their work and cannot 
fully improve their living standards according to their rising contributions (ILO, 2011).
According to Elgin and Kuzubas (2013), wages are determined as an outcome of 
the Nash bargaining process between employees and companies. Th e bargaining power 
of each side depends generally on the current labor market situation and this process of 
wage determination reduces the wage productivity gap that could be much higher when 
one side possesses signifi cant power (workers or company). Th e unemployment rate has 
an impact on wages because a higher unemployment rate reduces the probability for 
fi nding a job and workers are willing to work for a lower wage. Th erefore, unemploy-
ment and bargaining power are signifi cant determinants of the great decoupling.
Zavodny (1999) states that the declining power of trade unions contributes to 
the productivity-wage gap because trade unions strive to increase wages and compensa-
tions in relation to productivity growth. Meager and Speckesser (2011) emphasize that 
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countries with greater union coverage should have a clearer link between productivity 
and wages.
Also, we can investigate the wage-productivity gap according to a diff erent de-
mographic segmentation of employees. Literature mostly deals with the gender wage 
and productivity gap while expressing various conclusions according to diff erent indus-
tries, demographic and social characteristics of the genders etc. (Nestić, 2010; Galen, 
2015; Goraus and Tyrowicz, 2014).
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
OVERVIEW
Over the last decade, average wages in advanced economies grew by only 5.2 
percent. Despite the negative eff ect of the crises in the fi nal year of the decade, labor 
productivity has been growing by 10.3 percent, or almost twice as fast as wages. Produc-
tivity-wage gap began to spread due to a low wage growth during the pre-crisis period. 
Weaker bargaining power of employees and the rise of non-standard forms of employ-
ment with low wages contributed to the emergence of the great decoupling (ILO, 2011). 
Bivens et al. (2014) emphasize that the wage stagnation is a consequence of policy choic-
es that boosted the bargaining power of those with the most wealth and power. How-
ever, policy makers began to be aware of the connection between wage stagnation and 
inequality due to consequences for the society.
Garnero et al. (2016) investigated the impact of fi xed-term contracts (FTCs) on 
labor productivity, wages (i.e. labor cost) and productivity wage gaps (i.e. profi ts). Th e 
authors conducted an analysis of employer-employee panel data for the 1999-2010 pe-
riod and concluded that the share of FTCs within companies did not have a signifi -
cant impact on productivity, wages and profi ts. Lower productivity of permanent and 
part time workers was compensated by lower wages while company’s profi ts remain 
unchanged. Th ey did not fi nd causality between FTCs or other types of contracts and 
productivity, wages or profi ts.
Werner (1999) found that wage diff erentials matched productivity diff erentials 
for certain groups of workers, while for others they did not. For example, Zajkowska 
(2013) showed that there was a statistically signifi cant diff erence in wages per month 
between men and women on the Polish labor market. Productivity factors were reward-
ed diff erently while men had a higher return to both schooling and the potential labor 
market experience. Van Ours and Stoeldraijer (2010) dealt with age wage-productivity 
gap and concluded that empirical studies on the eff ect of age on productivity and wag-
es bring diff erent results. In some studies, it is obvious that workers who grow older 
contribute to an increasing wage-productivity gap because their wages increase with 
age while productivity does not or increases at a lower rate. In other studies, there is no 
age-related wage-productivity gap. 
Islam et al. (2015) pointed out that the main observation from the analysis of 
literature on productivity-wage gap indicated the existence of diff erent forms of linkag-
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es between the two variables. Th ere is literature that does not show any clear causality 
which can explain the connection between labor productivity and real wages, while 
other empirical literature can clearly explain respective causality.
According to the current market situation, Mistral (2009) stated that a diver-
gence can be found between real wages increase and productivity gain in advanced 
economies since 1990s. In the last decade, wage trends started to decouple from gains 
in labor productivity while the wage inequality issue appeared (ILO, 2011). Th ere is an 
obvious divergence trend between real labor income per hour worked on the one hand, 
and output per hour worked (labor productivity) on the other in many advanced econ-
omies (OECD, 2012).
Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) stated that the great decoupling in the United 
States is more than obvious. Wages have never been lower while profi ts have never been 
higher  (Brynjolfsson, 2015). 
Zulfan Tadjoeddina (2016) examined the links between productivity, wages and 
employment in Indonesia’s manufacturing sector and found out that the decoupling 
trend between real wages and productivity in the overall manufacturing sector is evi-
dent. It is important to emphasize that the author examined only one economic sector 
and that he also found even a more signifi cant wage-productivity gap between large–
medium (LM) and cottage–small (CS) manufacturing fi rms.
Cowgill (2013) examined real labor income per hour worked on the one hand, 
and output per hour worked on the other in the Australian case. Th e author conclud-
ed that Australian real wages have not kept pace with productivity growth since 2000, 
which is also the case in many other OECD countries. Lopez-Villavicencio and Sylva 
(2011) investigated the relationship between the wage-productivity gap and the unem-
ployment rate in OECD countries between 1985 and 2007 by analyzing how employ-
ment protection across countries aff ected the great decoupling occurrence. Th e authors 
emphasized that wage growth exceeded productivity growth for permanent workers 
while this was not true for temporary workers which had a lower bargaining power.
Elgin and Kuzubas (2013) conducted a research by using a cross-country panel 
data set consisting of 31 OECD countries over a time span of 50 years between 1960 
and 2009. Th e authors concluded that unemployment and unionization shocks had a 
signifi cant relationship with the great decoupling. Th eir paper defi nitely provides so far 
the most widely covered approach of the observed issue, although the limitation of their 
paper consists in focusing on the manufacturing sector due to data unavailability.
Meager and Speckesser (2011) observed the wage-productivity gap for EU-152 
countries for the period from 1995 to 2009, by using only descriptive statistics - GDP per 
hour of work and labor compensation per employee were employed, and the conclusion 
was that United States faced a greater challenge in dealing with the wage-productivity 
issue than the EU-15 countries. 
2 Th e EU15 comprised the following 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom (OECD glossary).
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We found only a few papers that deal with the productivity-wage relationship on the 
individual European state level. For example, Nikulin (2015) used the average annual mac-
ro-data for the period 2002-2013 and found out that trajectories of wages and productivi-
ties in Estonia, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia are diversifi ed while a 
strong relationship was confi rmed between wage and productivity ratio changes in Poland 
in relation to the Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary. Lovasz and Rigo (2009) investigat-
ed the productivity and wage gaps in Hungary for the period 1986-2005 and concluded that 
there may be signifi cant diff erences in productivity and wages between groups of workers, 
but these mostly become insignifi cant at the level of the company.
Pessoa and Reenen (2012) defi nitely shed a new light on the decoupling of wage 
growth and productivity growth in the United Kingdom, by describing it as a myth. 
Th ere was no net decoupling as economists would generally think of it, and they came 
to this conclusion by analyzing the trajectories of wages and productivity growth by 
employing diff erent types of approach.
Th ere have been no previous precise scientifi c literature dealing with wage-pro-
ductivity and compensation-productivity gap for Croatia, Germany and Poland to 
which we could refer.
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We constructed a data set of total compensation of employees and real labor 
productivity per person employed in order to determine the causality between these 
two variables for Croatia, Germany and Poland. Real labor productivity at state level is 
expressed as the real GDP and total labor compensation (at current prices) as the total 
remuneration per person employed. Data has been taken from the Eurostat database.
Quarterly data during 2000Q1-2015Q4 was used and the analysis was done in the 
program Eviews 9. All variables were seasonally adjusted by ARIMA x11 methodology.
In order to test the causality between total compensation and productivity 
growth, we applied the Granger causality test to analyze to what extent the change of 
past values of one variable accounts for later variation of other variables. Granger causal-
ity exists between variables yt and xt, if by using the past values of variable yt, the vari-
able xt can be predicted with better accuracy, and relating to a case when past values of 
variables yt are not being used, with an assumption that other variables stay unchanged 
(Gelo, 2009:330). Th erefore, the following two equations are specifi ed as follows:
where COM is an abbreviation for compensations and PR for labor productivity. De-
pending on the specifi cation of the equations, the hypotheses for the Granger causality 
tests are:
COM( )t =α + βi
i=1
m∑ COM( )t−i + Tj PR( )t− j
j=1
n∑ + μt
PR( )t = θ + φi
i=1
p∑ PR( )t−1 + Ψ j
j=1
q∑ COM( )t− j +ηt
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Th e presence of a stochastic trend is determined by testing the presence of unit 
roots in time series data, which were tested by the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) test 
and the Philips and Perron (1988) test which is more robust. According to the test results 
given in Table 1, variables were not stationary in their levels and were transformed into 
stationary through the form d(x) i.e. integrated of order (1) (Dickey and Fuller, 1979; 
Esaka, 2003).
 Table 1: Unit root tests for Croatia, Germany and Poland
Variable
Croatia
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test Philips and Perron test
Level d(x) Level d(x)
COM -1,05   -2,59**  -0,54  -11,99*
PR -0,03  -1,87**  -0,57 -2,61*
Variable
Germany
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test Philips and Perron test
Level d(x) Level d(x)
COM -0,57 -3,49** -2,92 -14,34*
PR -2,27 -3,59** -2,60 -14,21*
Variable
Poland
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test Philips and Perron test
Level d(x) Level d(x)
COM  -2,69  -4,22**  -2,74 -9,61** 
PR  -0,71  -2,72*  -2,03 -14,52** 
(*) and (**) indicate signiﬁ cance respectively at 1% and 5%
Variables: COM – Total compensations of employees in current prices, PR – Labor productivity per person employed.
Source: created by the author
Aft er stationarity test was done for each variable, Vector Autoregressive (VAR) 
models with stationary variables were done in order to determine the appropriate lag 
length. Due to the fact that the Granger causality test is very sensitive to the selection of 
lag length, we followed the procedure strictly in order to avoid pitfalls. To determine the 
appropriate lag length, which avoids the problem of spuriousness, we used the Akaike 
and Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (Akaike 1987). A maximum of eight lags 
were considered for each variable when determining the lag length due to the quarterly 
data (see tables in appendices). Aft er the Vector Autoregressive models were re-specifi ed 
H0  ? βi
i=1
n∑ = 0,xi    does not influence yt
H1  ? βi
i=1
N∑ ≠ 0,xi    influences yt
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according to appropriate lag lengths, we tested their signifi cance with the Portmanteau 
residual auto correlation test, the Portman Lagrange Multiplier test to test for serial cor-
relation of residuals and the Jarque Bera normality test of residuals to be sure that the re-
sults of the Granger causality tests would be meaningful. When the models successfully 
passed all the tests – there were no auto correlations, serial correlations and residuals 
were normal (see tables in appendices), the Granger causality test for each country, with 
appropriate lag length, was carried out. 
For better graphical observation and explanation of the great decoupling issue, 
total compensation of employees and real labor productivity per person employed were 
expressed as indices (2010=100) (fi gures 1, 2 and 3).
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
According to the ILO (International Labor Organization) report from 2013, the 
global crisis had signifi cant negative repercussions for labor markets refl ected in lower 
average and real wage growth, while some developed economies even recorded a real 
wage decline. 
It is obvious from Figure 1 that compensations of employees constantly rose until 
the global crisis, while productivity dropped. Aft er the global crisis, compensations and 
productivity were constantly intertwined showing clear evidence that the great decou-
pling cannot be found on the example of Croatia.
Figure 1: Compensation of employees and labor productivity 
per person employed for Croatia
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In the years before the global fi nancial crisis, expectations of rapid income con-
vergence led to an increase in wages in Croatia, while aft er the crisis wages in Croatia 
adjusted more slowly to changes in the macroeconomic environment than in the EU10 
countries (Orsini and Ostojić, 2015). Weber (2016) states that Croatian wages and pro-
ductivity are not aligned because of labor market ineffi  ciency. 
Figure 2 shows that German productivity and compensations had almost the 
same trend until 2009 when compensations started to rise by much higher rates than 
productivity. Obviously, the great decoupling does not exist because it supposes that 
productivity grows by a rising marginal rate while compensations constantly decline 
and cause a widening gap between them. In the German example, the situation is com-
pletely diff erent because aft er 2009, compensations rose by much higher marginal rates 
and caused the widening gap opposite to the great decoupling term. Th is phenomenon 
should be called “inverse decoupling” as a new term.
Figure 2: Compensation of employees and labor productivity 
per person employed for Germany 
Source: created by the author according to the data collected from the Eurostat database.
Generally, Germany is a country marked by a low rate of unemployment and a 
strong economy. Renner (2013) concluded that in the period before the crisis, Germany 
was marked by a massive shift  from full-time jobs to lower-pay part-time employment 
while average wage fi gures masked the extremes of wage inequality. It is important to 
emphasize that Card et al. (2013) stated that the increasing dispersion of West German 
wages arose from a combination of rising heterogeneity between workers and rising 
dispersion in the wage premiums at diff erent establishments, while Kluge and Weber 
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West Germany refl ected the diff erences in workers, establishment, and regional charac-
teristics rather than diff erences in productivity. 
Th ese facts could explain inverse decoupling that points to the issue of the possi-
ble rising inequality of labor income (wages and compensations) as stated by Felbermayr 
and Baumgarten (2015) and Schmid and Stein (2013). From the Global wage report 
(2015) it is obvious that aft er the crisis, German labor compensations have constantly 
grown while they now exceed productivity growth. Th is situation shows us that the gen-
eral standard of German employees has risen on average. According to Deutsche Welle 
(2017), German real wages grew in the past few years and caused the highest increase in 
2015 compared to 20 years before.
From the Figure 3 we can see that productivity in Poland continued to grow from 
2000, while compensations started following productivity growth from 2009. In a short 
period, from 2002-2005, there was a decoupling of productivity growth and compen-
sation, and then it began to taper until the global crisis. Before the international crisis, 
productivity growth led to economic growth which caused the convergence of the in-
come with the advanced industrial countries (Mari et al., 2014). Meager and Speckesser 
(2011) point out that rising productivity per employee can be explained by the growth 
of Poland’s competitiveness.
Figure 3: Compensation of employees and labor productivity 
per person employed for Poland
Source: created by the author according to the data collected from the Eurostat database.
During the crisis, productivity per employee in Poland did not mark a sharp 
decline. Th e most reasonable explanation for this is that Poland had the highest share 
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the most fl exible labor market among all European Union member states (Bogumil, 
2015).
Table 2 shows the results of the pairwise Granger causality tests for the observed 
countries in order to fi nd out if there is any causality between labor productivity and 
compensations. Evidence that supports the validity of the Granger causality tests has 
been obtained by the Johansen test of co-integration between these two series (in ap-
pendices). 
Table 2: Results of the pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Pairwise Granger Causality Test Hypothesis F-statistic Probability
Croatia
No causality between productivity and compensations 1,43 0,22
No causality between compensations and productivity 1,39 0,24
Germany
No causality between productivity and compensations 8,28 0,0000
No causality between compensations and productivity 11,55 0,0000
Poland
No causality between productivity and compensations  3,53 0,0134
No causality between compensations and productivity 3,28 0,0188
Source: created by the author
According to the Granger tests, there exists a causality in Germany and Poland 
between productivity and compensations but also vice versa.  Th is is confi rmed by the 
fact that the Johansen test of co-integration shows that there are two co-integrations be-
tween the observed series. On the example of Croatia, there is no causality between pro-
ductivity and compensations, nor co-integration relationships between these variables.
In Germany and Poland, compensations follow productivity which means, ac-
cording to Sherk (2013) that workers earn more when they become more productive. 
A more developed, and better regulated economy leads to better relationships between 
labor productivity and compensations. Germany and Poland are great examples of this. 
In addition, Germany and Poland have some of the most fl exible labor markets with 
a signifi cant share of part time and limited contracts that could also be the reason for 
the existence of causality between productivity and compensations. During economic 
downturns, these markets can easily adapt their need for labor force according to the 
market demand. 
It is important to emphasize that there is also causality between compensations 
and productivity in Germany and Poland. Authors like Yamoah (2013), Chun and Lee 
(2015), and Mphil et al. (2014) state that the impact of compensations on productiv-
ity can be found in economies which have well-developed systems of compensation 
management. Countries that generally have well-developed systems of compensation 
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management are extremely competitive which is, according to Meager and Speckesser 
(2011), the case in Germany and Poland. Th e implementation of eff ective compensation 
schemes leads to the achievement of organizational goals and refl ects the increase in 
competitiveness.
In the case of Croatia, there is no causality between compensations and produc-
tivity (also vice-versa) which is a sign that the country needs to improve its fl exibility of 
the labor market and economic competitiveness. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Economic literature dealing with the wage-productivity gap claims that the labor 
productivity growth outstripped the real wage growth leading to the decline in the labor 
income share across the globe. However, according to the trajectories of compensations 
and productivity in the cases of Croatia, Germany and Poland, it can be concluded that 
compensation growth has not fallen massively behind productivity growth. Trajectories 
of compensations and productivity development in observed countries are diversifi ed. 
In most cases, constant interweaving of productivity growth and compensations are 
characteristic for all countries. Th e productivity - compensation gap exists but only for 
certain periods of time and this is most obvious in Poland. In addition, according to the 
results of the Granger causality test, it can be concluded that more developed countries 
should have a stronger link with the productivity and compensation of employees.
From an aggregate macroeconomic point of view, there is no powerful empiri-
cal proof which can lead to the conclusion that there exists a large and continuous gap 
between compensations and productivity of employees in these economies. Increased 
labor market fl exibility does not contribute to the creation of the gap between produc-
tivity and compensations, but it could certainly contribute to labor income inequalities. 
Results of the conducted research are in accordance with the conclusions of Mea-
ger and Speckesser (2011), Sherk (2013) and supported by the research of Pesoa and 
Renen (2012), which show that over the past 40 years there has been almost no net de-
coupling in the United Kingdom, although there is evidence of substantial gross decou-
pling in the Unites States. If the United States face the great decoupling, it does not mean 
that the same trend is also present in Europe.
Th is research is important and unique because it deals with the compensation – 
productivity gap between these countries on an individual state level and reveals new 
insights about the great decoupling issue. Th e paper does not deal with other less devel-
oped countries, nor does it include employment and unemployment rates which could 
clarify the causes of trajectory movements, and this represents a limitation of the paper. 
Future research should explore the areas mentioned above.
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APPENDICES
Table(s) 4 VAR tests, defying optimal lag length and Johansen co-integration test 
for Germany
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0  161.8992 NA   6.48e-06 -6.270558 -6.194800 -6.241609
1  195.8628  63.93134  2.00e-06 -7.445598 -7.218325 -7.358750
2  234.2389  69.22754  5.21e-07 -8.793682 -8.414893 -8.648935
3  331.0903  167.1161  1.37e-08 -12.43491 -11.90461 -12.23227
4  366.1679   57.77500*   4.06e-09*  -13.65364*  -12.97182*  -13.39310*
5  368.9602  4.380090  4.28e-09 -13.60628 -12.77295 -13.28784
6  371.5168  3.809730  4.58e-09 -13.54968 -12.56483 -13.17334
7  374.6237  4.386183  4.80e-09 -13.51465 -12.37829 -13.08041
8  376.0503  1.902263  5.40e-09 -13.41374 -12.12586 -12.92160
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)
 FPE: Final prediction error
 AIC: Akaike information criterion
 SC: Schwarz information criterion
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion
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Probs from chi-square with 4 df.
VAR Residual Normality Tests
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob.
1 -0.101720  0.094847 1  0.7581
2 -0.248277  0.565045 1  0.4522
Joint  0.659891 2  0.7190
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob.
1  3.019240  0.000848 1  0.9768
2  3.398984  0.364806 1  0.5458
Joint  0.365654 2  0.8329
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.
1  0.095695 2  0.9533
2  0.929851 2  0.6282
Joint  1.025546 4  0.9059
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
Hypothesized Trace 0.05
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
None *  0.215220  17.50756  15.49471  0.0246
At most 1 *  0.073153  4.178189  3.841466  0.0409
 Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
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Table(s) 5 VAR tests and defying optimal lag length and Johansen co-integration 
test for Poland
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0  134.0034 NA   2.58e-05 -4.889016 -4.815350 -4.860606
1  147.3834  25.27319  1.82e-05 -5.236421 -5.015422 -5.151190
2  150.3086  5.308737  1.90e-05 -5.196614 -4.828284 -5.054563
3  221.9370  124.6866  1.55e-06 -7.701371 -7.185709 -7.502500
4  249.1205   45.30574*   6.61e-07*  -8.560017*  -7.897023*  -8.304326*
5  250.4314  2.087776  7.34e-07 -8.460422 -7.650095 -8.147911
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)
 FPE: Final prediction error
 AIC: Akaike information criterion
 SC: Schwarz information criterion
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion







Probs from chi-square with 4 df.
VAR Residual Normality Tests
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob.
1 -0.795611  5.802477 1  0.0160
2 -0.137774  0.173999 1  0.6766
Joint  5.976476 2  0.0504
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob.
1  3.945689  2.049502 1  0.1523
2  2.322102  1.053127 1  0.3048
Joint  3.102629 2  0.2120
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.
1  7.851978 2  0.0197
2  1.227126 2  0.5414
Joint  9.079105 4  0.0592
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None *  0.247292  23.65793  15.49471  0.0024
At most 1 *  0.135899  8.033623  3.841466  0.0046
 Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
Table(s) 6 VAR tests and defying optimal lag length and Johansen co-integration 
test for Croatia
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0  166.8542 NA   5.34e-06 -6.464870 -6.389112 -6.435921
1  186.6707  37.30174  2.87e-06 -7.085127 -6.857853 -6.998279
2  221.0107  61.94659  8.75e-07 -8.274929 -7.896140 -8.130183
3  224.3175  5.705877  9.01e-07 -8.247745 -7.717440 -8.045100
4  237.9237  22.41017   6.20e-07*  -8.624458*  -7.942637*  -8.363914*
5  241.6364  5.823801  6.31e-07 -8.613190 -7.779854 -8.294748
6  242.1956  0.833436  7.29e-07 -8.478260 -7.493408 -8.101919
7  244.0654  2.639655  8.03e-07 -8.394721 -7.258353 -7.960481
8  253.8980   13.11018*  6.50e-07 -8.623452 -7.335568 -8.131314
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)
 FPE: Final prediction error
 AIC: Akaike information criterion
 SC: Schwarz information criterion
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion








Probs from chi-square with 4 df.
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VAR Residual Normality Tests
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob.
1 -0.303997  0.831726 1  0.3618
2  0.079453  0.056814 1  0.8116
Joint  0.888540 2  0.6413
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob.
1  3.764424  1.314774 1  0.2515
2  2.551459  0.452674 1  0.5011
Joint  1.767448 2  0.4132
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.
1  2.146500 2  0.3419
2  0.509489 2  0.7751
Joint  2.655989 4  0.6169
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PROCJENA FENOMENA “VELIKOG RAZDVAJANJA” NA 




U ekonomskoj literaturi mogu se pronaći mnogi radovi koji istražuju vezu između 
realnih nadnica i produktivnosti radne snage pri čemu autori koriste različite pristupe i 
aspekte istraživanja. Rasprostranjeno je mišljenje kako u mnogim zemljama rast nadnica 
značajno opada u odnosu na produktivnost radne snage što uzrokuje jaz produktivnosti 
i nadnica popularno nazvan „veliko razdvajanje“. Rad se bavi ovim važnim pitanjem 
istražujući „veliko razdvajanje“ na primjeru Republike Hrvatske, Njemačke i Poljske an-
alizirajući kretanja i uzročnost kompenzacija zaposlenika i produktivnosti. Važno je i 
jedinstveno s obzirom da predstavlja novi empirijski pristup istraživanju problema razd-
vanjanja produktivnosti i nadnica na individualnim državnim razinama. Istraživanje 
donosi zanimljive rezultate koji ukazuju na to da je fenomen „velikog razdvajanja“ u pro-
matranim zemljama mit što je očito iz kretanja stopa promatranih varijabli. Međutim, 
postoji uzročnost produktivnosti i kompenzacija zaposlenika (također obrnuta veza) na 
primjeru Njemačke i Poljske dok ona na primjeru Republike Hrvatske ne postoji.
Ključne riječi: veliko razdvajanje, inverzno razdva janje, jaz produktivnost-nad-
nica, Grangerova uzročnost.
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